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COMMENTS
PROPERTY-CONDOMINIUM IN PENNSYLVANIA-PANACEA OR
PANDORA'S Box ?t
I.
INTRODUCTION.
The passage of the new Pennsylvania Condominium, or Unit Property
Ownership, Act' may well provide a new stimulus to the home building
industry by making it possible for a prospective home owner to choose
between a unit in a new apartment house in the city and a detached house
in a suburban residential subdivision on a more equal competitive basis.-
This law can help to curb suburban sprawl and aid materially in the re-
development of cities. It provides not only for new housing opportunities,
but also presents new possibilities for the construction of business, com-
mercial, and industrial buildings within the city, and for shopping centers
and industrial parks in the suburbs. It may also provide a new basis for
planned residential communities in the suburbs, which will give much
needed stability to the mushrooming housing developments that have
dotted the landscape since the end of World War II.
Essentially, the new law permits the subdivision of a building or a
group of multiple-unit buildings into separate units, each capable of sale,
purchase, mortgage, taxation, and assessment as completely independent
of any other unit as a separate lot in a subdivision of land. Each unit will
include the space exclusively occupied by the owner together with a pro-
portionate undivided interest in the common elements, which will include
the land, foundations, main walls and roof of the structure, hallways, walks,
t This comment was prepared in furtherance of the program of, and with material
assistance from, the Communities Research Institute in the School of Law, Villanova
University. The Institute was founded in 1958 with a generous grant by the Home
Builders Association of Philadelphia and Suburbs to conduct research in the law
relating to home building and community development as an aid to local government
officials, home owners, the building industry, and the general public.
1. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, approved July 3, 1963. At the time of this writing,
thirty-one other states had passed enabling acts for condominium. House And Home,
Aug. 1963, p. 8; Wall Street Journal, July 31, 1963, p. 1, col. 5.
2. "Condominium" or "unit property ownership" is a new concept in the common
law but has much wider application in the civil law. It first made its appearance
within the wider limits of the United States in Puerto Rico, where the "Horizontal
Property Act", P. R. LAws ANN., tit. 31, § 1291 (Supp. 1960), has furnished both
pattern and impetus for later state statutes. See generally Ramsey, Condominium,
the Nez, Look in Cooperative Building, A. B. A. SECTION OF REAL PROI'ERTY, PRO-
BATE AND TRusT LAW, Part II, 4 (1962).
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driveways and other designated common facilities.3 Not only will the units
be capable of separate ownership but, conversely, no mortgages, liens, or
assessments for taxes and improvements will be permitted on the land,
building, and common facilities as a whole. Instead they must attach to
each unit according to its proportionate interest in the common property.
The source of the prevailing contemporary interest in the condominium
concept can be traced to efforts of the Federal Housing Administration,
since its creation in 1934, to improve the housing supply and to increase
home ownership in the United States.4 This has been accomplished through
a program of guaranteeing mortgages for the construction and purchase
of housing which will carry out the broad objectives of the Federal agency. 5
Since the high cost of land has made detached housing uneconomical in the
city, and multiple housing has traditionally been supplied on a rental basis,
one effect of the administration's program has been the proliferation of
suburban developments to the detriment of the cities.( A growing group
of home owners, whose purchases have largely been made possible by
guaranteed mortgages, has left the city, and its place has been taken pri-
marily by an influx of unskilled workers. The problems of dislocation, the
increasing costs of municipal services, and decreasing tax revenues are too
familiar to need an extended recital.
Some effort has been made to provide multiple unit housing in the
form of cooperative apartments, 7 but there are difficulties in this form of
ownership which make it unsuitable for all but the wealthier investors. In
the usual pattern of cooperative ownership, title is taken by a corporation
or a business trust, while the proprietary tenants supply a share of the
capital in exchange for a lease of space.8 Although the cooperative can be
organized in such a way that the proprietary tenants will not incur the
personal liability of joint adventurers for the mortgage, taxes and the costs
3. In the terms of the Federal Housing Act, it is "a one-family unit in a multi-
family structure and an undivided interest in the common areas and facilities which
serve the structure." National Housing Act, § 234, added by 75 Stat. 160 (1961),
12 U.S.C. § 1715y (Supp. IV, 1962).
4. For a general discussion of the role of the Federal government in home
building and promoting home ownership, see BEYER, HousINc--A FACTUAL ANALYSIS
237-59 (1958); HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 650-66 (1959).
5. Federal support has not been confined to home ownership, but has included
rental housing as well. Under Section 608 of the National Housing Act, 56 Stat. 303
(1942), 12 U.S.C. § 1743 (1958), some 470,000 rental housing units were produced
between 1947 and 1951. HAAR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 661.
6. Placing some share of the blame on the Federal housing program for the
housing and population problems facing the cities, Professor Haar has written, "Gov-
ernment inducements to purchase in the suburbs have facilitated a remarkable increase
in homeownership since the war but have endangered the future existence of the
American city." HAAR, FEDERAL CREDIT AND PRIVATE HouSING 209 (1960). On the
characteristics of the housing supply generally, see BEYER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 36-46.
7. Section 213 of the National Housing Act, as amended, authorized the insurance
of mortgages on a "nonprofit cooperative ownership housing corporation or nonprofit
cooperative ownership housing trust, the permanent occupancy of the dwellings of
which is restricted to members of such corporation or to beneficiaries of such trust."
71 Stat. 297 (1957), 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (a) (1) (1958).
8. 4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 632 (1954) ; McCulloch, Co-operative Apartments
in Illinois, 26 CHL-KENT. L. REv. 728 (1948); Yourman, Some Legal Aspects of
Coopcrative Housing, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 126 (1947).
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of maintenance, it was found during the depression that when one tenant
was unable to meet his share of the expenses and there was no ready mar-
ket for his lease, the others were faced with the choice of answering for
their neighbor's default or losing their own investment, a choice which
obviously precipitated other defaults.9 In effect, the proprietary tenant is
not so much an owner of his own apartment as an investor in an apartment
project, whose dividends are realized in the form of the right to use and
occupy specific space. This form of apartment ownership is therefore not
completely competitive with the ownership of a detached house, and it is
the purpose of the new condominium laws to eliminate these disadvantages
insofar as the nature of the building will permit.' 0
In 1961, the National Housing Act was amended to authorize the
insurance of mortgage loans for the construction and purchase of one
family units in a multifamily structure which include an undivided interest
in the common areas and facilities serving the structure." Federal law does
not, however, make provision for the subdivision of land and buildings to
meet the requirements of the act, nor does it condition the guarantee of
mortgages upon the enactment of a specific form of statutory authority by
the state.1 2 Under the common law of Pennsylvania, as well as that of
other states, it is quite possible to create a "single family unit in a multi-
family structure. 1 3 Some progress has already been made in the direction
of separating the ownership of land from the ownership of buildings erected
thereon, or in dividing the ownership of the upper and lower floors of a
single building; but, in general, these activities have involved large business
structures and have been accompanied by complicated negotiations, elabo-
rate conveyances, and problems of recording and tax assessment. 14 In
9. Ross, Condominium in Calijornia-The Verge of an Era, 36 So. CAL. L. Rev.
351, 353-54 (1963) ; Smith, The Case for a Condominium Law in Pennsylvania, 33
PA. B. A. Q. 513, 517-18 (1962).
10. Ramsey, Condominium, the New Look in Cooperative Building, A. B. A.
SECTION OF REA, PROi'ERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW, Part II, 4 (1962); Smith,
The Case for a Condominium Law in Pennsylvania, 33 PA. B. A. Q. 513 (1962);
Comment, Community Apartments, Condominium or Stock Cooperative, 50 CALIF. L.
Rev. 299 (1962).
11. National Housing Act § 234, added by 75 Stat. 160 (1961), 12 U.S.C. 1715y
(Supp. IV, 1962).
12. Ramsey, op. cit. supra note 10, at 5. See also Welfeld, The Condominium and
Median Income Housing, 31 FORDTHAM L. REv. 457 and n. 4 (1963).
13. But the problems involved, particularly in order to qualify for FHA insur-
ance, make such an attempt both hazardous and cumbersome. See Ross, supra note
9, at 354-62; Welfeld, supra note 12, at 458-61 ; Outen, Condominium Comes to Town,
Title News, Dec. 1962, p. 12, 13-15; Smith, supra note 10, at 515-17; Ramsey, supra
note 10, at 10-11; Comment, The Condominium: Apartment Ownership in Louisiana,
37 TUL. L. Rev. 482 (1963).
14. Tax assessment has been viewed as the largest problem. Ramsey, supra note
10, at 10. FHA regulations require that the condominium be located in a jurisdiction
where property taxes must be assessed against each unit as an entity, in order to be
eligible for insurance. 24 C.F.R. §234.26 (1962). The Wall Street Journal, July 31,
1963, p. 1, col. 5, reported that thirty-one states had adopted legislation authorizing
separate tax assessment. See Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 701. There are also difficulties
in recording the plan of subdivision, where approval of such a plan is required by
law, the statutes having been drawn only in contemplation of the subdivision of land.
Ramsey, supra note 10, at 10; Wenig, Government Regulation of Condominium in
California, 14 HASTINGS L. J. 222, 225-40 (1963).
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the light of such considerations, which are matters scarcely suited to the
needs of a mass housing market, the Pennsylvania Bar Association deter-
mined to sponsor the bill which has now been enacted into law.
While interest in the new law can be traced to the Federal Housing
Administration's preoccupation with housing and home ownership, and
while federally guaranteed loans are available only for housing, 15 the
Pennsylvania General Assembly has given much wider scope to the act,
extending it to commercial and industrial structures as well.16 The act
applies not only to single multiple-unit buildings, but also to complexes
of such buildings." It could be used to provide group housing projects,
like the familiar Chatham Village in Pittsburgh, which set the pattern for
extensive institutional investing. Chatham Village is a community of
approximately one hundred semi-detached housing units, sharing common
lawns and landscaping, walks, driveways, parking areas, and garage
compounds.
The breadth of the act will be especially appreciated when industrial
operations and commercial projects need to share common siding, parking,
or storage facilities which can be located in multiple unit buildings. It
would seem by a fair construction of the act, bearing in mind its purposes,
that it does not apply to single unit buildings,' even though they may be
grouped together in a common enclosure or may require cooperative main-
tenance of common facilities, apparently because they present no problems
which are not already capably managed under previous subdivision laws.
The act deals only with instances in which it may be expedient to sub-
divide buildings rather than land.
There are three aspects of the statutory scheme which will be discussed
in detail below. First, the act deals with the title of the unit owners, de-
fining the relationships of the parties to the property and to each other,
establishing the means for creating .and terminating the condominium rela-
tionship, and for transferring and hypothecating the separate interests.
15. Federally guaranteed loans may not be available for all types of multi-unit
housing which might seem to qualify under the act. A certain amount of discretion
is vested in the Commissioner to grant or withhold insurance "under such terms and
conditions as he may prescribe (including the minimum number of family units in
the structure which shall be offered for sale and provisions for the protection of the
consumer and the public interest) . . ." National Housing Act § 234, added by 75
Stat. 160 (1961), 12 U.S.C. 1715y (Supp. IV, 1962). Regulations pertaining to con-
dominium are found in 24 C.F.R. § 234 (1962). See Condominium-A Symposiitn,
Title News, Dec. 1962, p. 28, 38-41, where the author expresses doubt that a row house
could qualify, although there is nothing explicit in either the national act or the
regulations which would exclude such a structure.
16. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 102 (1).
17. Ibid.
18. But note that the new act defines "building" as "any multi-unit building or
buildings or complex thereof . . ." Ibid. It can be argued that "multi-unit" modifies
only the first word in the series, "building". To support this construction, it may be
pointed out that there can be no problems of subdivision with a single one-unit building,
but there can be such problems with a complex of buildings, each of which contains
but a single unit. The row house would clearly appear to be covered, as the act
pointedly permits either vertical or horizontal arrangement of the units. Ibid.
Compare the language of the title, which announces the act as "[r]elating to the
ownership of real property, the division thereof into units ... "
COMMENTS
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Second, the machinery is created for keeping the building and the common
elements in repair and distributing the costs thereof among the unit
owners. Third, there are provisions for maintaining harmony in the use
and occupancy of the premises.
II.
THE PROBLEMS OF TITLE.
The concept of condominium requires two things: the separation of
the ownership of improved land into a number of independent units, and
the complete disappearance of any other interest in" the land as a whole. This
problem concerns not only the parties to the agreement, who have con-
siderable freedom, but all persons who may be involved: the state, the
local taxing authorities, and those persons who, through legal action or
for work and materials furnished, may become entitled to a lien. There
are many ways in which a satisfactory result could be accomplished, and
it is intended here to examine the specific statutory solution, comparing it
with available alternatives, and then to discuss the mechanics of creating
and terminating the condominium relationship.
As stated above, the new act deals only with land that has been im-
proved with a multiple-unit building or buildings or a complex of such
buildings. 19 A unit is a portion of a building designed for the separate and
exclusive occupancy and use of a person, family or business, having sepa-
rate access to a public way, either directly or through a common area, and
including an undivided interest in all other parts of the land and buildings
which are not designated for the exclusive use and occupancy of another
unit owner. 20 This interest in the common elements is declared to be
inseparable from the rest of the unit for any purpose.2 1 In contrast to the
cooperative apartment where, as in any landlord-tenant situation, the occu-
pant's individual rights in the land would be classed as a chattel real or a
contractual interest rather than real property,22 the act declares the owner-
ship of a condominium unit to be for all purposes the ownership of real
property. 23
Essentially, the act provides for a subdivision of buildings,2 4 and in this
respect, is unlike a conveyance of "airspace" or "horizontal property." In
19. See, however, note 18, supra.
20. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 102 (14).
21. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 202.
22. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.12 (Casner ed. 1952).
23. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 201. A caveat might be voiced at the use of the
term "ownership", rather than one or more of the familiar common law estate terms.
Whether the courts willwattach any significance to this in future litigation may prove
to be a question of some interest.
24. This distinction is not made in all contemporary statutes, or it has been over-
looked by the commentators. In discussing proposed California legislation, the possi-
bility was raised of a "wet condominium" in harbor areas, consisting of a fee con-
veyance of cubes of water space for boat storage together with a tenancy in common
ownership of pilings, ramps, etc. Wenig, Government Regulation of Condominium
in California, 14 HASTINGs L. J. 222, 223 and n. 6 (1963). A still more recent Act
has dealt with the conveyance of airspace. See Pa. Laws 1963, act 419, effective
October 14, 1963.
[VOL. 8
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a conveyance of airspace, land is subdivided not only in terms of the surface,
but in three dimensional terms extending above and below the surface, this
space being regarded in law as part of the land. 25 If a conveyance of air-
space is involved, it is not necessary that a building be constructed or con-
tinue to exist to effect a separation of title. Since the new act has chosen
to treat the condominium as a subdivision of buildings, completion of the
building and its continued existence are necessary to permit an owner to
claim a separate, rather than a common, interest. When a building intended
for subdivision under the act is erected, it may be financed by a construction
mortgage and is subject to liens for work and materials. All of these must
either be discharged or each unit released before the first conveyance of
any unit may be made.2 6 When the building is destroyed, an opportunity
is provided for restoring it instead of terminating the condominium at
once. 27 On termination of the condominium, either by agreement of the
parties or as a result of refusal to reconstruct after substantial destruction,
the unit owners become tenants in common of the land with its remaining
improvements. 28
The Act's treatment of those portions of the land and buildings which
are not intended for the exclusive use of any single unit owner is a novel
one. In a subdivision of land, rights of access and other rights of common
enjoyment, such as the right to use a park, usually take the form of ease-
ments, public or private, upon the land of one or other of the purchasers.
In a conveyance of airspace, the rights of access and support are usually
treated as easements upon the land of the owner of the surface.29 Where
the landlord-tenant relationship involves a multiple-unit building, the ten-
ant's rights and duties are only those immediately related to occupancy,
while the landlord retains exclusive control of portions such as the roof
and has the duty to make available in safe condition the common passage-
ways.30 Under the new Condominium Act, the unit owners become tenants
in common of such areas 3 and, as such, all have the right to use and the
duty to maintain those portions.3 2 Severance, abandonment, or partition
25. For a discussion of the law relating to airspace and the problem of thedurability of an interest in airspace, see Ball, Division Into Horizontal Strata of the
Landscape Above the Surface, 39 YALE L. J. 616 (1930) ; Bell, Air Rights, 23 ILL.
L. REv. 250 (1929) ; Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L.
REv. 631 (1928). See also Brennan, Lots of Air-A Subdivision in the Sky, A. B. A.
SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW 24 (1955). In Pennsylvania,
the sale of coal in place is recognized, Lillebridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 143 Pa.
293, 22 Ati. 1035 (1891), but litigation involving air rights has largely been confined
to cases of telephone wires and low flying aircraft. See Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power
and Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956) ; Gardner v. Allegheny County, 382
Pa. 88, 114 A.2d 471 (1955).
26. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 404.
27. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 802.
28. Ibid.
29. See Brennan, supra note 25; Bell, supra note 25.
30. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.45, 3.78 (Casner ed. 1952).
31. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 201.
32. Lane v. Harrold, 72 Pa. 267 (1872) ; Kline v. Jacobs, 68 Pa. 57 (1871) ; 2
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.13-6.15, 6.17-6.18 (Casner ed. 1952). Maintenance
is discussed infra, Section III.
COMMENTS
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of the common elements, except when the condominium has been dissolved,
is specifically forbidden. 33
One problem raised by treating the unit owners as tenants in common
is that of determining the relative rights and liabilities of the owners.
Should these depend upon the relative value of the units, or the degree to
which some make more extensive use of the common passageways than
others, or should the owners be treated equally? The new act anticipates
this problem, requiring that a statement be made in the declaration 34 of
the interest of each unit in terms of percentages totalling one hundred
percent in the aggregate. 5 The assigned relative value may be changed
only by unanimous agreement of the unit owners and must be duly re-
corded.3 6 Proportions established in this manner control not only the
assessment of costs of maintenance and operation, but also the right to
share in operating profits and the right of partition, when it is exercised
after dissolution of the condominium. 7 All voting, when required by the
act, is to be on the basis of these same percentages,38 so that a majority
vote would require the vote of persons holding more than a fifty percent
interest in the common elements, regardless of number.
In some contemporary statutes a distinction is made between general
common elements, those which are of concern to all unit owners, and
limited common elements, which are of concern to less than all unit
owners.39 For example, under such an act, a swimming pool might be
constructed and its use limited to certain luxury units. Accordingly, any
assessments concerning the pool would be made only to the privileged
units.4 0 A similar distinction between units would arise under the Penn-
sylvania act only through the provision for reconstructing one of several
buildings which has been substantially destroyed. 41 The unit owners directly
affected may elect not to rebuild, and would become entitled to partition.
In this proceeding, the court will be required to make some appropriate
33. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 202.
34. One of the two basic documents necessary to establish the condominium is the
declaration which is discussed infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
35. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 401 (5). While no standard is made requisite for
apportioning the shares, the influence of marketability would seem to demand that
the assigned interest be based on the relative value of the unit to the entire structure.
Some other states have made this an express stipulation. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1006
(Supp. 1961); Cong oF LAws oF S. C. § 57-476 (Supp. 1962); P. R. LAws ANN.
tit. 31, § 1291f (Supp. 1962).
36. Provision for change is made in section 202 Pa. Laws 1963, act 117. The dec-
laration is required by law to contain a statement that the proportions may be altered
by the recording of an amendment, duly executed by all unit owners. § 401 (6).
While the condominium cannot be removed from the provisions of the act without
the consent of all the unit owners and those persons having recorded liens against
any of the units (§ 601), lienors are not given statutory power to object to a change
in the proportionate ownership of a particular unit owner in the common elements.
Would this preclude an action based on fraud?
37. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, §§ 311, 802.
38. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 312.
39. ARIz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 33-551 (Supp. 1962) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-1002
(Supp. 1961) ; Ky. Rev. STAT. § 381.810; CON OF VA. § 55-79.2 (Supp. 1962) ; P.
R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1291i-91j (Supp. 1962).
40. See CODE oF VA. § 55-79.13 (Supp. 1962).
41. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 802.
[VOL. 8
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division of the land and to treat insurance proceeds and salvage value of
the destroyed building as belonging to the unit owners directly affected.42
Except for this one case, all unit owners are treated as having a common
interest in all the common elements, and any inequity in the assessment of
maintenance costs which might result should be taken into account in
fixing the percentage of ownership in the declaration or amendments
thereto.
The condominium is created by executing and recording two docu-
ments: a declaration and a declaration plan.43 Among other matters, the
declaration must state the intent to place the land and the buildings within
the operation of the act; must describe the whole property and the separate
units; must name the original members of the governing council; and
must establish the relative interests in the common elements and provide
that these may be changed by unanimous action of the unit owners. 44 The
declaration plan, corresponding to an ordinary subdivision plan and recorded
in the same records, must show graphically the location of the land and
the buildings on the land, designate the units and the common elements
in the buildings, and be certified by a registered architect or a licensed
professional engineer. 45 To complete the transfer from single to unit own-
ership there must be a first conveyance of each unit after all liens on the
land and building as a whole are either discharged or the unit released. 46
All further conveyances or mortgages of a unit are made by reference to
the declaration and the declaration plan. 47
The condominium relationship may be terminated by the unanimous
action of all unit owners and all persons having recorded liens on the
units, 48 or by a vote of three quarters of the unit ownership not to rebuild
following "substantially total destruction" of the building.49 In the latter
instance partial termination is possible, as previously noted. When the
condominium is terminated by the unanimous action of the unit owners, the
act provides that this will not prevent resubmisssion of the property at a
later date.50 A temporary termination may prove advantageous in obtaining
mortgage financing on the entire property for repairs, remodelling, or im-
provements. When the condominium is terminated, the unit owners become
tenants in common of the whole property in the proportions fixed in the
declaration. 51
42. But partition has its limitations. A court might be reluctant to impose it
where it would prejudice the interests of those owners unaffected by the destruction
of the building. See generally GOODRICH-AMRAM STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRAC-
TICE §§ 1551-74, 1590, 1591 (1960).
43. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 103. This section requires only a declaration.
However, one of the requirements of the declaration is that it refer to a declaration
plan. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 401 (4).
44. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 401.
45. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 402.
46. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 404.
47. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 405.
48. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 601.
49. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 802.
50. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 603.
51. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 602.
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When the building has been substantially destroyed, continued exist-
ence of the condominium is impossible unless it is rebuilt, because it is the
building rather than the land which has been subdivided.5 2 A decision to
rebuild depends upon many factors, but the overriding considerations will
be the availability of funds in reserves or insurance and the desirability of
restoring the building unchanged in plan.5 3 The act provides that the coun-
cil shall rebuild unless three quarters of the ownership elects to the con-
trary.54 In these provisions there are implied some interesting checks and
balances. The council might not be able to rebuild, if it has no funds,
without the unanimous consent of all unit owners and all holders of recorded
liens on the units, because mortgage financing would require a temporary
dissolution of the condominium.5 5 If the council has funds, then it must
act unless the necessary three quarters vote otherwise. 6 In anticipation of
possible destruction of the building, the council may insure the property
at common expense, if retluired by the declaration, the code of regulations,
or a majority of the ownership.57 Recognizing that it is difficult to provide
by a general rule the conditions under which a property should be restored,
the system which has been devised seems fair to all persons.
Should any part of the common elements be taken through the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, each unit owner is entitled to notice and
the right to participate in any proceedings.58 But damages will be deter-
mined as a whole, rather than individually, although each unit owner will
be then entitled to his share of the damages according to his percentage of
ownership in the common elements.5 9
III.
PROBLEMS OF MAINTENANCE.
Maintenance of the land, buildings, and common facilities, together
with the general conduct of the business of the condominium, is specifically
delegated in the new law to a council.6 ° The council will have power to
act on behalf of the unit owners and to assess the costs of its operations
to them proportionately. 61 Members need not be unit owners and, except
for the requirement that they be natural persons resident in the Common-
52. See text accompanying notes 24-25, supra.
53. Consider the problem involved if the building, or one of several buildings,
was not restored in its original dimensions. Would unanimous consent of the unit
owners still be necessary to alter the assigned shares of the common elements if the
restored units varied greatly from the originals?
54. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 802.
55. A mortgage on the entire structure after the initial conveyance of units is
not expressly prohibited, but consider the effect of the statement that the "undivided
interest in the common elements may not be separated from the unit to which such
interest pertains." Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 202.
56. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 802.
57. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 801.
58. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 803.
59. Ibid.
60. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, §§ 306 (1), 307 (1).
61. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 306 (2).
[ VOL. 8
9
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
SUMMER 1963]
wealth, their choice would seem to be unlimited. 62 The original members
must be designated in the declaration, 63 but the procedures for their re-
placement 64 are contained in the code of regulations which the first members
of the council must adopt and record, and which thereafter may only be
altered or amended by a majority of the ownership entitled to vote at a
unit owners' meeting.6 5 The council is required to annually elect a presi-
dent, secretary, treasurer, and any other officers for whom provision may
be made in the code of regulations.66 These officers may be compensated.
67
In the management of the property, the council may enter into con-
tracts, engage employees and appoint agents, and fix their compensation. 8
An easement is granted to the council to enter any unit to make repairs to
the common elements, and also to make repairs to the unit when this
becomes necessary for the prevention of damage to the public, to other units,
or to the common elements. 69 The act provides that all maintenance,
repairs, replacements, and any additions or improvements to the common
elements may be made only as set out in the code of regulations. 70 This
may imply the approval of a majority of the ownership, voting according
to their relative interests. 71 Since by unanimous consent the unit owners
may authorize common expenses other than those specifically designated, 72
it would seem that the establishment of reserves for future additions and
improvements would be a prudent action. If a mechanic's lien arises for
work authorized by the council, it attaches proportionately to each unit.
72
The specific provisions for assessing the costs of the council's operations
to the unit owners implicitly deny the power to bind the unit owners in
any other way as their agent.
The expenses properly incurred by the council are charged to the unit
owners in proportion to their relative interest in the common elements, as
established in the declaration or any amendments thereto.74 Not only is
the authority to assess given in the act,75 but it is also required that the
first deed to each unit contain an express covenant, binding on the original
grantee and all subsequent owners, to pay assessments. 76  Liability for
expenses is thus personal as well as real, so that a unit owner who has
disposed of his property may continue to be liable for his unpaid assess-
62. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 102 (5).
63. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 401 (8).
64. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 303 (4).
65. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 302.
66. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 303 (5).
67. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 303 (6).
68. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 307 (1).
69. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 310.
70. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 308.
71. Conceivably a dissatisfied majority might attempt to block repairs by amend-
ing the code of regulations. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 302.
72. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 102 (4) (ii).
73. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 704.
74. See notes 35-36, supra.
75. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 306 (2).
76. The provisions of the covenant are mandatory and are set out in the act.
Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 403 (5).
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ments.7 Whether an owner who has conveyed away his interest will be
liable for expenses incurred but not assessed, or for expenses neither in-
curred nor assessed at the time of his conveyance, remains for future
decision. 78 It should be noted that both the statute and the covenant speak
of assessments and do not refer to the incurring of expenses. Unit owners
have the right to inspect the financial records of the council during regular
business hours.79
Assessments are made by a duly adopted resolution of the council.80
They are a lien against the unit from the time when made, taking priority
according to the usual rules after previous liens of record and taxes,," and
drawing interest at the rate of six percent from the thirtieth day following
adoption of the resolution.8 2 The lien must be protected by notice at a
sheriff's sale of a unit, but it will be lost if the amount bid is insufficient
to cover it.8 3 If authorized by a majority of the ownership, the council
may purchase the unit at the sale to protect the lien. s4 The purchaser at
a voluntary sale will take subject to the lien, unless he is previously notified
in writing by the council that there are no unpaid assessments.8 5 The
council is required by law to furnish such a statement, losing the lien if
any unpaid assessments are not disclosed.8 6 If a lien is lost at a sheriff's
sale or on a voluntary transfer, the amount may be reassessed proportionally
against all unit owners, including specifically the new purchaser.8 7  An
unpaid assessment may be reduced to a judgment and enforced by an
action of assumpsit 8s If such an action is begun, it is to be indexed as
lis pendens against the unit.8 9
Except through the assessment procedure just described, the council
does not have the means for raising funds for its operations.9" It is not
given the specific power to execute a mortgage which would bind the unit
owners proportionally like the mechanic's lien previously mentioned, and
such a mortgage would be of little value if it did not take priority over
other liens. If it is necessary to obtain new mortgage financing to rebuild,
replace, improve, or make additions, the condominium would have to be
77. When a purchaser at execution sale or voluntary sale takes free of the
lien of assessment under the provisions of §§ 705 and 706, it must be implied that
the council will attempt to collect the assessment from the former owner before
reassessing the amount due. See discussion on lost liens, infra. text accompanying
notes 83-87.
78. The seller remains jointly liable for all assessments which are a charge
against the unit at the date of sale. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 706.
79. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 313.
80. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 702.
81. This is not stated specifically in the act but is inferred from the declaration
that a unit is real property. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 201.
82. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 702.
83. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 705.
84. Ibid.
85. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 706.
86. Ibid.
87. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117,§§ 705, 706.
88. Pa. Laws 1963 act 117, § 703.
89. Ibid.
90. But note that unpaid mechanic's liens for work properly ordered by the
council are liens against each unit. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 704.
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dissolved temporarily, requiring unanimous action of all unit owners and all
persons having a lien of record against any unit."' To the extent that the
council is able to raise and maintain an adequate operating reserve, the
limitation on its power to obtain funds will present no problems. It is
foreseeable, however, that after a long period of operation during which
maintenance has been adequate, a condominium will be faced with the
decision to modernize by substantial improvements or to face problems of
obsolescence affecting the value of each unit. The council may, with the
approval of a majority of the ownership, amend the code of regulations
to provide for a renewal program,92 but one single owner, or his mortgagee,
can deny the power to dissolve the condominium in order to obtain
mortgage financing. 93
It is questionable how such a situation could be solved. A court might
be able to find that the need to maintain the condominium for the benefit
of all the unit owners implies a power to mortgage and to subordinate
other liens. If the situation is an extreme one where public authorities
can order the building abandoned unless repairs are made, a court could
find that such power was reasonably to be implied.9 4 If the situation is
one in which reasonable persons could debate the necessity of the repairs,
a court could not be expected to act. Between these two extremes an
infinite variety of possibilities exist. The law recognizes in other situations
the creation of liens and the subordination of prior liens based on the
principles of salvage. 95 If it is argued that mortgage funds will not be
available unless lenders can be assured of a first lien, it can be answered
that, in view of the fact that financing tends today to be extended over a
period approaching the life of the building, a mortgagee will have greater
assurance if he knows that there is adequate power to keep the building
in repair. For a time, this question will be moot if the Federal Housing
Administration is willing to insure the risk.
IV.
USE AND OCCUPANCY.
In addition to dealing with questions of title and with the maintenance
of the buildings upon which title depends, the Pennsylvania Condominium
Act makes provision for controlling the use and occupancy of the premises
91. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text.92. Under § 102 (4) (iii), common expenses include those so declared in the
code of regulations. Thus, a mere majority could amend the code to authorize vir-
tually any expenditure at the equal expense of the dissenters.
93. See notes 48-51 and acctmpanying text.
94. In Central Savings Bank v. City of New York, 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d
151 (1938), a statute was held unconstitutional that subordinated a mortgage to a
lien necessary to make a tenement house habitable. On the peculiar facts of that
case, however, the building was of no value to the mortgagee, and the mortgagor
benefitted at its expense.
95. In cases of chattel mortgages, this principle is recognized. The Uniform
Commercial Code subordinates a perfected security interest to a bailee's lien. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-310 (Supp. 1962). Compare Williams v. Allsup, 10 C.B., N.S.
417 (1861) with Storms v. Smith, 137 Mass. 201 (1844).
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-a matter which may be expected to become more complicated as larger
numbers of people are brought together in new apartment groupings. The
importance for the welfare of any community that there exist a certain
compatibility among the residents is undeniable. Putting aside for the time
being problems arising from ethnic differences, which are today com-
plicated by questions of civil rights, some families object to neighbors with
children, pets, pianos, or an affinity for late and noisy guests.96 The pur-
chaser of a business location, for example, a pharmacist taking a shop in
a shopping center or on the ground floor of a large apartment building,
will want the usual assurances against competition. Power to give such
an assurance makes the location more valuable and produces greater profit
for the developer. Where occupants are permitted to overcrowd their units,
indulge in offensive uses, or allow their dwellings to become dilapidated,
there is a deleterious effect on the whole neighborhood.
These problems are much more adequately dealt with when an apart-
ment or a business building is owned by a landlord than when several
persons own their own homes on separate tracts in a subdivision of land.
Except as now limited by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,9 7 a
landlord may select his tenants and impose binding covenants against
assignment of the lease.9 8 He may covenant not to lease to a competitive
enterprise, and the tenant may treat a breach as a constructive eviction or
as giving rise to a cause of action for damages. 9  A landlord may reserve
a large degree of control over the maintenance of the leased premises,
possibly holding a tenant liable for waste if he fails to maintain the
premises.' 0 0 The manner of use of apartments may be regulated by binding
lease covenants, for the breach of which remedies are available not only to
the landlord but to other tenants as well, who may compel the landlord to
abate a nuisance created by another tenant by an action for breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment, or by treating the landlord's failure to
remedy the situation as a constructive eviction. 1 1
Between neighboring landowners in a subdivision, few of these controls
are available. Restraints on alienation, even for a limited period, are
illegal.10 2 The use of restrictive covenants has been developed to a point
96. Professor Haar notes that until 1947 the FHA considered even inharmonious
racial groups as adverse influences on a community and offered a model racial
restrictive covenant, which it recommended be included in all deeds. HAAR, LAND
USE PLANNING 662 (1959). Today, any such covenant is expressly prohibited. 24
C.F.R. §§ 234.50, 234.66 (1962).
97. Under this act, a person may be forced to cease and desist from unlawful dis-
criminatory practices and to take such affirmative action as selling or leasing specified
commercial housing upon such equal terms and conditions as will effectuate the policies
of the act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (Supp. 1962).
98. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF" PROPERTY § 3.58 (Casner ed. 1952). For special con-
siderations involving cooperatives, see id. at § 3.10.
99. University Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 265 Il1. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914); I
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.42 (Casner ed. 1952).
100. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 3.39-3.40 (Casner ed. 1952).
101. Id. §§ 3.47, 3.51.
102. Northwest Real Estate Co. v. Serio, 156 Md. 229, 144 Ati. 245 (1929).
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where they are the backbone of private community planning,1 0 3 being more
useful than possibilities of reverter or rights of re-entry because they may
run to other purchasers of land in the development.10 4 Although they may
be used to control patterns of development, restrictive covenants have not
proved effective as a means of controlling dilapidation.1 5 So inadequate
have private land arrangements been' 0 6 that recourse has been had to
public measures: planning and zoning, 0 7 redevelopment and conservation. 08
There is no provision in the new act for controlling the choice of
neighbors. In cooperative apartments and in some planned community
developments, this has been attempted by making each unit subject to the
right of first refusal if it is sold. 0 9 Applied to the condominium, this would
entail a possible draft on each tenant in proportion to his ownership of the
common elements to raise the necessary funds. This would tend to make
condominium ownership undesirable to any but the more wealthy purchasers
who can afford to take the risks of cooperative apartment ownership, thus
defeating the very purpose for which the Federal Housing Administration
has introduced the condominium concept." 0
The new law provides that the declaration may contain a statement
of the purposes or uses for which each unit is intended and impose restric-
tions on use."' No provision is made for amending the declaration with
respect to restrictions so imposed. The council is required to adopt a
procedure for making rules governing "the details of the use and operation"
of the property, and is charged with the duty of making such rules, subject
to revision by a majority of the ownership." 2 Each unit owner has the
duty to comply with the code of regulations, the rules governing use of the
property, and any covenants, conditions, and restrictions set forth in the
declaration or in any deed." 3 Failure to comply is grounds for an action
for damages or injunction, which may be brought by the council, by any
103. See Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877). But cf.
Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. App. 743, 254 Pac. 1101 (1927).
104. Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corp., 247 N.Y. 131, 159 N.E. 886 (1928).
105. This would be a problem of affirmative covenants. See Neponsit PropertyOwners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793(1938).
106. See Cohen v. Perrino, 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947) ; Norcross v. James,140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885).
107. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114(1926).
108. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S. Ct. 98 (1954).
109. In the case of the cooperative apartment, the restraint can be justified
because of the landlord-tenant relationship. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.10(Casner ed. 1952). Between freehold owners, the question is whether the option
must be exercised within the Rule against Perpetuities. Compare Barton v. Thaw,
246 Pa. 348, 92 Ati. 312 (1914), with Mumma v. Hinkle, 20 Pa. D.&C.2d 621 (C.P.1959). The latter case followed the "wait and see" amendment of the Rule against
Perpetuities. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1947). See Rubens, Right of First
Refusal and Waiver of the Right of Judicial Partition, 14 HASTINGS L. J. 255 (1963).
110. See generally Welfeld, The Condominium and Median-Income Housing, 31
FORDHAm L. REv. 457 (1963).
111. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 401 (7).
112. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, §§ 303 (9), 306 (3).
113. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 304.
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unit owner, or by any person holding a mortgage upon an injured unit.' 14
The council is also given an easement to enter any unit to abate a condition
which may threaten the safety of the public, the common elements, or any
other unit.'15
These powers are very broad, but they must be read in the light of
the declaration in the statute that the owner's interest in a unit, with its
appurtenant share of the common elements, is real property, and his rela-
tionship to that unit is ownership rather than tenancy."l 6 Would a covenant
restricting alienation to any family with more than three children, or an
affirmative covenant to maintain the property in compliance with a standard
set by the council, or a restrictive covenant not to compete with any previous
purchaser be valid and enforceable? Would it be competent for the council,
with the approval of a majority of the ownership, to provide in the code
of regulations against offensive uses which would not in themselves con-
stitute a public nuisance, and, if so, would prior nonconforming uses be
inviolate ?
These problems and many like them will arise and be brought into
court. One can only predict that the results will differ, depending upon
whether the courts choose to treat the unit owners conceptually as if they
were the owners of separate lots in a subdivision, or whether they decide
to regard the unit owners functionally as if they were all tenants of one
landlord, cooperative or otherwise. For purposes of title and mortgage
financing it may be desirable to treat unit owners as complete freeholders,
but this does not require that they be treated as such for all purposes. As
far as the problems of sharing the close quarters of a common structure
are concerned, a condominium apartment is functionally the same as a
cooperative or an apartment house owned by an independent landlord.
What has been found desirable in the one case will probably prove equally
desirable in the other. If the courts will recognize this, working out case
by case the distinction between proper controls and unfair impositions, a
new era in land use controls may well result.
V.
CONCLUSION.
The new Pennsylvania Condominium, or Unit Property Ownership,
Law reflects careful study and wise planning. Whether or not it will have
wide use is another matter. Neither state nor Federal Government has
made the condominium a subject of public housing. They have left it to
the building industry to use creative methods to feel out and stimulate
demand and to take the ultimate risks. Though condominium should at
114. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 305.
115. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 310.
116. Pa. Laws 1963, act 117, § 201.
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least partially obviate the lack of competitive housing, there may remain
other factors causing the flow of population away from the cities which
will render its overall effect on this problem nugatory.
Michael B. Kean
Alan A. Sanders
COPYRIGHT-EXTENSION OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM: A RE-APPRAISAL
OF AMERICAN POLICYt
I.
COPYRIGHT DEVELOPMENT
With the invention of the printing press, authors1 began to realize the
financial potential their writings would have if a way could be found
to protect their claimed property interests in the method of expressing
their thoughts. Although there are some earlier accounts of limited copy-
right attempts, 2 the legislative development of our modern system of
copyright law began with the Statute of Anne,3 enacted in England in 1709.
That statute granted the author and his assigns a twenty-one-year term
for works then in publication, but for works published after April 10, 1710,
there was to be a fourteen-year term, with a right of renewal for a second
fourteen-year term should the author be living at the expiration of the
first term.
The earliest American legislation on the subject was directly inspired
by the Statute of Anne. In January of 1783 Connecticut passed the first
American statute. The Continental Congress on March 7, 1783, passed a
resolution suggesting enactment by the various states of copyright provi-
sions along the lines of the Statute of Anne.4 By 1786, twelve of the
original thirteen states (all but Delaware) had enacted copyright statutes. 5
t A draft of this Comment is being entered in the 1963 ASCAP Nathan BurkanMemorial Competition at Villanova University School of Law.
1. The term "author" will be used throughout by the writer to include all
creators of copyrightable works.
2. See Kampelman, The United States and International Copyright, 41 AN.x J.
INT'L L. 406. The author believes that the first copyright sanctioned by law was
granted in Venice in 1469 to one John of Spira, who was to have the exclusive right
to print the letters of Cicero and Pliny for seven years. Id. at 407.
3. Copyright Act, 8 Anne c. 19 (1709).
4. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 326, 327 (1922).
5. Massachusetts on March 17, 1783, EDEs, ACTS AND LAWS OF MASSACIIUSETTS
236 (1783); Maryland on April 21, 1783, GIEEN, MARYI.AND LAWS, ch. 34 (1783);
New Jersey on May 27, 1783, CoLrrNs, ACTS oF THE GENERAL AssE.mmRl op NEw
JERSEY, ch. 21 (1783); New Hampshire on November 7, 1783, MELCHER. LAWS OF
NEw HAMPSH¢RE 161, (1789); Rhode Island in December, 1783, CARTE:l, RHODE
ISlAND ACTS AND REsOI.vEs 6 (1783); Pennsylvania on March 15, 1784, BRADFORD,
LAWS OF PENNSYIVANIA, cl. 125 (1784) ; South Carolina on March 26, 1784, MI.LER,
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Since these statutes were not enacted at a national level, they were not
uniform 6, a factor clearly presenting an intolerable situation for authors
seeking national protection. Of course, this major fault of the Confedera-
tion was not limited to the copyright field, and the pressure for national
uniformity in many fields gave birth to our Constitution in 1789. In
article I, section 8 of the Constitution, Congress was given the authority
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." It should be noted that the Constitu-
tion effectively precludes Congress from granting copyright in perpetuity
by virtue of the phrase "for limited Times." Pursuant to such a grant of
power, Congress enacted the first national copyright statute in 1790.7
This statute substantially followed the Statute of Anne in the length of
terms granted; however, the original term was to be measured from the
date of registration rather than the date of publication.
The enactment of the aforementioned legislation provoked comment
on the status of copyright under the common law. Some insisted that copy-
right was purely a creature of statute, while others claimed that the statutes
merely qualified or added to the author's rights under common law. In the
case of Millar v. Taylor8 an English court stated that authors had a per-
petual and sole right to their works and that the Statute of Anne was an
addition to this right, and furthermore, the author's right was not lost by
publication. Such a view, at least as to duration of the right, is not wholly
unrealistic. However, the view of the Statute's effect on common law
rights was severely criticized. The House of Lords finally overruled Millar
in 1774 in the famous case of Donaldson v. Beckett9 where it was held
that the Statute of Anne had superseded any common law rights and was
now the exclusive depository from which authors must draw their copy-
right protection. The United States Supreme Court first faced the prob-
lem in Wheaton v. Peters.10 The Court declared that common law copy-
right had never existed in the United States and consequently copyright
was based entirely on statute. The Supreme Court's statements must be
qualified to the extent that common law, as well as the copyright statute,
still protects authors of unpublished works from the unauthorized publica-
tion of their works. Once published, however, all rights stem from the
statute.
SOUTH CAROLINA ACTS, ORDINANCES AND RESOLVES 49 (1784); Virginia in October,
1785, DUNLAP & HAYES, VIRGINIA ACTS 8 (1785); North Carolina on November 19,
1785, LAws OF NORTH CAROLINA, ch. 24 (1785) ; Georgia on February 3, 1786,
CHANDLER, COLONIAL RECORDS Op GEORGIA, Vol. 19, 485 (1911) ; New York on April
29, 1786, LAWS or NEw YORK, ch. 54 (1786).
6. Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, -New York, Maryland and Pennsylvania
strictly adhered to the Statute of Anne, while Massachusetts, North Carolina, South
Carolina, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia each provided for single terms,
varying from fourteen to twenty-one years.
7. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
8. 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
9. 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
10. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
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II.
COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES STATUTE AND FOREIGN STATUTES
It was certainly not unusual for the United States to initiate its copy-
right law by a statute similar to that of England, since the American
system of law is based on and has developed in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.
Although the United States in the enactment of its first copyright statute
took its cue from England, in the course of development of copyright
legislation the two countries have not followed similar patterns. England
ultimately has abandoned her original theory of basing the copyright term
on a definite number of years, while the United States has continued to
denominate the length of its term. Both countries have substantially
lengthened the term from that prescribed in their original statutes.
The English statute was revised in 1814 to provide for a twenty-eight-
year term or the author's life whichever was longer,1 in 1842 to a term of
forty-two years or the author's life, plus seven years, whichever was the
longer, 12 and finally in 1911, to the life of the author plus fifty years,"
which is the length of the term at present. 14 Thus, as early as 1814, the
English statute changed its base period from determining the term from
a certain number of years to a variable, the life of the author.
In the United States the development of copyright has maintained a
set pattern since the initial statute. The duration of the copyright was
expanded in 1831 from an original fourteen-year term with a fourteen-year
renewal to an original term of twenty-eight years.' 5 In 1909, the statute
now in force lengthened the renewal term to twenty-eight years but changed
the starting point of the original term from registration to publication.',
Thus, there is now the possibility of a fifty-six-year term. Both the English
and American statutes reflect a trend toward greater expansion of the
term, and neither country has ever attempted to shorten it.
Almost without exception the English method of determination of the
copyright term, with its far more generous provisions, has been followed
by other countries of the free world. Nicaragua and Portugal provide for
copyright in perpetuity. Life of the author plus eighty years is the stand-
ard applied in Colombia, Panama and Spain; life plus sixty years is the
law in Brazil; and in over half the countries which provide for copyright
protection the term is life plus fifty years reflecting the influence of the
English term.' 7 It should be noted that these standards apply only where
11. Copyright Act, 1814, 54 Geo. 3, c. 156.
12. Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45.
13. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 34.
14. Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 2.
15. An Act To Anend The Several Acts Respecting Cop ,rights, § 2, 4 Stat. 436
(1831).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1958).
17. SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS. AND COPYRIGHTS OF TrE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT LAW
REviSION, STUDY No. 30 AT 59 (Conim. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as SUB-
COMMITTEE ON PATENTS].
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the author of the copyrighted work is an individual. For works by non-
individuals, for example, corporations or anonymous authors, a specific
number of years is (or should be) used to determine the length of the
term, simply because these authors are not ordinarily subject to death.
The only country with a copyright statute even remotely similar to the
United States is the Philippine Islands; there, the term is thirty years
with a thirty-year renewal term.' 8
Majority opinion, of course, does not necessarily represent the best
solution or even the proper approach in a particular controversy. Yet it
would seem that so great an imbalance in this controversy would dictate
a thorough and critical re-appraisal of the United States copyright term.
Virtually every other major free world nation has determined that a longer
copyright term will better serve the needs of the public and afford the
author a more equitable protection of his rights. The United States, on
the other hand, has retained a system of determining the copyright term
begun by the English over two centuries ago and abandoned by them over
a century ago. For fifty-four years the United States has steadfastly refused
to revise its statute.19 The overwhelming balance in favor of a longer
term among all the free world countries and the nohaction of the United
States Congress, would certainly prompt one to question our position.
III.
REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT TERM
In 1831, while amending the length of the copyright term, Congress
stated that its purpose was "to enlarge the period for the enjoyment of
copyright, and thereby to place authors in this country more nearly upon
an equality with authors in other countries. °20 This was certainly a noble
purpose for a country which was anything but a cultural and literary leader
of the times. But that same country, which has since risen to such a posi-
tion, has failed to keep pace with the protection granted authors in foreign
countries. Before Congress should revise our copyright law to conform to
those in a majority of foreign countries, it should of course be convinced
that the interests of our country from the standpoint of both author and
public warrant a step in that direction. Therefore, a close analysis of
reasons for and against such a change is required.
Before discussing the various factors affecting the length of the copy-
right term, it would be appropriate at this point to make some basic dis-
tinctions between copyrights and patents. A patent protects the creator's
idea, the substance of the invention, whereas a copyright only protects the
form of a work, that is, the sequence of words. One may not use the idea
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 62-70. As is seen from the short but thorough history of attempted
revision since 1909 contained in that study, some proposals received considerable
attention but none were enacted.
20. REPORT OF THE COMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE HousE OF REPREsENT-
ATIVEs, 7 Register of Debates, appendix 119 (1831).
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which is the basis of a patented invention without infringing on the patent.
However, the author has no exclusive right to a particular plot in his
copyrighted material, but only to his mode of expression. This distinction
is important. Since a patent controls the substance, rather than the form,
it prevents unauthorized use of the basic idea by another and therefore
creates a monopoly on that idea throughout the existence of the patent.
Once the stigma of monopoly is placed on a concept, extension of the
period of its existence becomes increasingly difficult because of the trend
against monopolies as evidenced by anti-trust legislation. Copyrights,
however, are in no sense monopolistic. An author may use the same sub-
ject matter or plot as -another author provided he does not copy the
actual sequence of words. If the method of expression is original to the
author, he is not infringing on any other copyright. Thus, the criticism
levelled at patents, which could hinder attempted patent extension, cannot
justifiably be attributed to copyrights, nor stand in the way of copyright
extension.
A. Economic Motivation
The foundation and basic purpose of copyright law is to provide an
economic return to authors with a view toward providing stimulation for
the exercise of their creative abilities. Certainly people always have created
and will continue to create because of their drive for self-expression. True,
they have created without thought of economic return, but absent this
benefit the creation has not generally been for the public at large, but
rather for some person or persons very close to the creator. Creation for
the benefit of the public, that is, for persons unknown to the author without
thought of economic return, and solely from a spirit of generosity and
altruism, is seldom witnessed. Nearly all men, creators included, are
motivated by economic factors. Accepting economic benefit to the author
as the basic premise of copyright, it follows that the greater the protection
granted, the greater the stimulative effect.
B. Property Interest
It could hardly be denied that the intellectual creativity of an author
expressed in his own particular style is the property of that person. Copy-
right law has limited this property right. The author's property interest
has been restricted to the right to determine who may publish or reproduce
his work for fifty-six years, after which the creation passes into the public
domain and may be reproduced by anyone without the author's permission.
If instead of writing a book an author were to build a house, or
plant an orchard, the answer would be that he is entitled to collect
rent as long as the house stands, or as long as the orchard bears fruit.
No one in our form of society dedicated to the ownership of private
property would assert that it was in the public interest to permit the
house to be used or the fruit to be gathered by any and all strangers
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free of charge, and for their own profit, just because the builder or
the farmer had enjoyed the property for 56 years. No one would
have the presumption to say to them, as has been said to the authors,
that 56 years is a fully adequate period for any owner to retain his
house or his farm. Yet, equally with the builder or the planter, the
author's ownership in his work is, in Disraeli's famous words, "the
most natural of all titles, because it is the most simple and least
artificial. It is paramount and sovereign, because it is a tenure by
creation. ' '21
Both the desire for stimulating creativity, and the apparent property right
of the author in his work would seem to indicate that his rights should be
perpetual, as are other property rights. One might ask whether the extinc-
tion of the author's exclusive rights to his work after fifty-six years is a
deprivation of property without due process of law. An affirmative answer
would be proper, but for the constitutionally imposed restriction on the
author's property rights in Article I, "for limited Times. '2 2 The Con-
stitution itself is a roadblock in the path of recognition of perpetual exclu-
sive property rights, which all but copyright and patent owners enjoy.
If an author cannot have the perpetual advantages of other property
owners, it would be unfair to deny him two of the attributes which all
other property owners enjoy: first, the right to the use and income of prop-
erty for the life of the owner, and second, the right to bequeath the use
and income of property to his heirs for at least a reasonable time after
his death. Non-authors can invest the product of their life's labors and
expect a return on that investment indefinitely. Similarly, the non-author
can expect the product of his life's labor to support him after retirement
and also create income for his heirs for an indefinite time after his death.
Under our present copyright law it is very possible that an author will
not enjoy these same benefits. The author could outlive his copyright and
then find that works earlier created, which are still producing a profit
upon publication, are not returning income to him in his old age. Even
if he does not outlive his copyright, he cannot be sure that his children
will receive a sufficient income until they attain maturity, nor can he leave
property to his heirs which will produce income indefinitely.
C. Revision Proposed by the Register of Copyrights and the
Life Expectancy Factor
The length of the present term was calculated to include both life
expectancy of the author and provision for his heirs for a reasonable time.
The fact remains that it has been fifty-four years since the last revision of
the copyright term. Between 1909 and 1960 life expectancy in the United
21. Hearing Before Subcoinmittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives on H.R.J. Res. 627, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27. at 3
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Hearing].
22. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
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States has risen approximately twenty-one years.2 3 Thus even assuming
that the 1909 statute was sufficient in length to provide the necessary
return, at present the term is clearly deficient by twenty-one years.
To rectify this shortcoming, the Register of Copyrights in his revision
report recommends extending the present renewal term from twenty-eight
to forty-eight years.2 4 This means that an author would get an original
twenty-eight-year term and upon renewal a forty-eight-year term-a total
protection of seventy-six years. Ironically, the seventy-six-year term was
calculated to be as near as statistically possible to the life plus fifty-year
term predominant in other countries.2 5 To an author this change would
represent an improvement, but if the life plus fifty-year term is the desired
end, why should an invariable seventy-six year term be used? The average
author will fit the scheme, but not every author.2 6 Obviously the length of
the necessary protective coverage will vary with the length of the life of
each author. When a variable factor, life, is used to base the term, the
term will be uniform in application. Regardless of the author's age at
death, under the term life plus fifty years he is assured of enjoyment of
the income from his work for life, and on death knows that his heirs will
have the benefits for fifty additional years. Under the seventy-six-year
term the author would have to copyright every work in the twenty-sixth
year before his death to achieve the same result-an impossible situation.
A further disadvantage inherent in the seventy-six-year term is that
it is based on life expectancy tables in use on the date of enactment. Life
expectancy, however, cannot be relied upon to remain stationary, especially
when one considers the rapid advances taking place in the medical field.
Perhaps an open-end provision could be provided so that the present re-
vised term would stand at seventy-six years, but the renewal term of forty-
eight years could be automatically increased when it is officially determined
by an appropriate federal administrative body that there has been an increase
in national life expectancy. We must remember that the underlying reason
for both the variable and fixed terms is not to provide a uniform number
23. In 1909 life expectancy in the United States was forty nine years, by 1960
it had risen to seventy years. 37 VITAL STATISTICS-SPECIAL REPORTS 12 (National
office of Vital Statistics 1953); 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 737 (1963).
24. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS To Housz COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., ON THE GENERAL REvISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW 51 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
25. Id. at 50, 51.
26. Ibid. The statistics used by the Register of Copyrights are: average age of
authors at death-sixty-eight years; average age at median between publication of
first and last books-forty-eight years; average span between median age at publi-
cation and age at death-twenty years. Using these statistics, it is concluded that a
seventy-year term would approximate the life plus fifty years term. The six addi-
tional years are allotted to future increase in life expectancy. Thus a seventy-six-
year term is the final proposal. For the author who lived sixty-eight years, if the
average life expectancy is used, all works written before his forty-eighth year would
receive less than life plus fifty years of copyright coverage. Similarly, the author who
lives beyond his sixty-eighth year will not receive the desired coverage for works
written more than twenty years before his death. It is seen that the author who lives
to be eighty, will not get the proper coverage for works published before his sixtieth
year, rather than his forty-eighth year on which the formula used to compute the
seventy-sixth year term depends.
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of years for each copyrighted work, but rather to provide copyright cover-
age for the life of the author, and fifty years for his heirs. The desirable
uniformity is sought not in length of term for each work, but in length of
coverage for the author and his heirs.
The advantage in providing the needed extension of the term in the
manner suggested by the Register of Copyrights is that we would retain
a system of calculating length of copyright to which we have grown
accustomed and know how to apply. However, such an attitude is analo-
gous to the individual who cannot discard a worn-out piece of furniture or
clothing, which is now out of vogue, simply because of the attachment
which comes from sheer length of contact. Such nostalgia has no place in
legislative purpose.
D. Reversion and a Two-Term Statute
The perplexing problem of reversion of the renewal term under
present law must be faced. Authors have always been considered singularly
unique for unwisely selling their valuable works for a pittance, and, through
commercial exploitation of these works, making fortunes for others. As a
practical matter, authors are usually in the inferior bargaining position.
(The only exception is the well-known author who is a member of an
author's protective association.) To rectify this matter, the present statute
attempted to provide a reversion of the renewal term to the author which
would give an author a "second chance" in negotiating for the rights to his
work. The Supreme Court when forced to interpret the wording of the
"second chance" reversion provision, concluded that there was no complete
reversion to the author.27 An assignment of the renewal -term by the
author was held to be effective if he lived until the twenty-eighth year of
the original term and renewal was made in the author's name. However,
if the author died before the twenty-eighth year, the rights for the renewal
term passed to his widow and children. Such an interpretation produced
chaos in the copyright field. Neither author nor publisher could ever be
certain about the disposition of the renewal term before the twenty-eighth
year. Even if the author wanted to sell the eitire rights in his work
because it was the most profitable alternative, he could not effectively do
so. He could not be sure he would live until the twenty-eighth year, nor
that his present wife and children would be the extent of his family at
that time, so that an assignment of their rights to the renewal term was
equally speculative. Consequently, the result was less protective than having
a definite provision either for or against reversion of the renewal term. If
it were certain that the renewal term was assignable, the author could
receive correspondingly more for the transfer of those rights, but, with all
of the aforementioned contingencies, a publisher would only take an
assignment of the renewal term for an amount commensurate with the risk.
For this reason many authors received little or nothing for their assignment
27. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. Witmark, 318 U.S. 643, 63 S. Ct. 773 (1943).
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of the renewal term for works still producing profits well after the twenty-
eighth year. The Register of Copyrights' proposal to remedy this situation
is to eliminate altogether any reversionary rights at the time the renewal
period is to begin. He proposes a reversion of assigned rights twenty years
after execution of such assignment, unless the assignment provides for
remuneration in the form of continuing royalties. If continuing royalties
are provided, assignment for the full seventy-six year term would be per-
mitted.2 8 When such an approach is used, the theory of a two-term system
for a definite number of years seems unnecessary. As previously stated,
the seventy-six-year term is meant to be statistically equal to the life plus
fifty years term. The only advantage in retaining a two-term system based
on a certain number of years would be to use it in conjunction with the
reversionary principle. That would not be done under the present pro-
posal. A provision for reversion to the author after twenty years for non-
royalty assignments could just as easily and effectively be inserted into the
life plus fifty years term. If what is desired by the seventy-six-year term
is to provide a life plus fifty years term for as many works as possible,
why should a system be used which may produce an approximation of the
desired result some of the time, when another system is available which
will give the actual desired result all of the time?
Advocates of the present system argue that a two term system enables
authors to more easily limit the time for which they contract away their
rights. Their theory is that the author would sell only one term at a time.2 9
This supposed advantage is not attributable to the two-term system but
rather to the contract between the parties. Even with a one-terrt system,
the parties, if they desired, could provide contractually for a twenty-eight
year period with reversion to the author.
As the proposed revision stands, it attempts to statistically duplicate
the life plus fifty years term and then adds the further complication of re-
quiring filing for a renewal period to gain the seventy-six-year coverage.
Considering that the two terms are not interwoven with the reversionary
principle, the use of two terms cannot serve any purpose. Once the deter-
mination is made that an author deserves seventy-six years of protection,
why should he be forced to renew his copyright by refiling after twenty-
eight years? Regardless of how much time is allowed for renewing, the
only result of such a useless requirement will be loss of rights to those who
fail to comply.
Early passage of the copyrighted material into the public domain
cannot be used to justify the two term system. The public will not be
affected one way or the other by a work of no commercial value, and
limited scholarly use of copyrighted material is permitted. Under both the
present and proposed two term systems, a determination is made that the
public domain may be prevented from claiming a work for either fifty-six
28. REPORT, supra note 24 at 93, 94.
29. SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, supra note 17 at 77, 81.
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or seventy-six years by the author's own act of copyrighting and renewing.
By copyrighting the author is implicitly stating that he wants protection.
If before the fifty-six or seventy-six years expire, he wants to donate his
work to the public domain, he may do so. Why force works into the public
domain after twenty-eight years as a penalty for failure to renew? If the
works should regain some value after the twenty-eighth year, this would be
lost to the author, yet the legislature apparently wanted him to have a
possibility of either fifty-six or seventy-six years of protection.
The one disadvantage frequently cited in criticizing the life plus fifty
years term is that it is often difficult to determine the date of an author's
death, which is the vital factor in such a system. The discovery and place-
ment of a particular fact is crucial to every legal problem. Time of death
is a fact question, the answer to which must be deduced from the best
information available. However, in arriving at such pivotal facts, juries
are as competent here as they are elsewhere in the law. Furthermore, the
number of cases where date of death is a disputed question should decrease
in the future with the increase in records required to be kept by govern-
ment authorities.
E. The Start of the Term
The Register of Copyrights also suggests a change in the base point
from which all copyrights would date under his seventy-six year two-term
proposal.,8 The present law starts the copyright term running upon first
"publication." Publication has become a word of art in the copyright field.
The word has very precise limits. Stage presentations, radio and television
broadcasts, and other public performances technically are not publications.
To constitute publication, a work must be printed and copies publicly dis-
tributed. 3 1 Before this is done the copyright term will not begin to run,
unless the work is voluntarily registered, even though there have been
innumerable public performances.
The revision proposal considers such distinctions illogical and unreal-
istic, and suggests that any public "dissemination" should start the term
running. If adopted, "dissemination", no doubt, will also become a word
of art. According to the proposal, dissemination to the public should be
interpreted to include publication of printed copies, registration, any and
all forms of public performances, and public distribution of sound recordings.
This is an attempt to put all methods of public exhibition of a work on
an equal plane. It is only fair that all forms of public exhibition be treated
alike. Under present law a playwright has an advantage over a novelist.
The playwright can realize income without publishing his play within the
meaning of the copyright statute and retain his exclusive common law rights
to his work. Practically speaking, the play will first be popularized on the
stage before commercial exploitation through "publication" will be eco-
30. RtosRT, supra 24 at 40, 41.
31. Id. at 40.
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nomically feasible. The novelist, however, depends on publication to draw
his first income from his work. When one considers that the development
of the radio, movie, and television industries has all occurred since the last
general revision in 1909, the placing of all forms of public dissemination
on an equal basis does no more than bring the present statute up to date.
IV.
THE INTERIM STATUTE
Pending the complete revision of the copyright statute, which Congress
estimates will require at least a few years, 32 a bill has been proposed which
is designed to prevent loss of copyright to those whose copyrights would
expire during the period of formulation of the new statute. This interim
statute is designated House Joint Resolution 627 and reads as follows:
JOINT RESOLUTION Extending the duration of copyright pro-
tection in certain cases.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That in any case
in which the renewal term of copyright subsisting in any work on
the date of approval of this resolution would expire prior to December
31, 1967, such term is hereby continued until December 31, 1967. 33
The supporters of this bill justify it on the ground of need for reform in
the copyright law. They contend that the present copyright term is too
short and if Congress undertakes to lengthen it in the immediate future
without enactment of an interim statute, those whose copyrights would
expire before the enactment would be deprived of the foreseeable benefits
of such a longer term. Conversely, those whose copyrights are just slightly
younger would receive the benefits because of a change in congressional
philosophy and the fortuitous circumstance that their copyright term did
not expire before enactment of the longer term.34 The supporters of the
bill have a forceful argument. Once the determination has been made that
revision of the law and extension of the copyright term is desirable, it
would be manifestly unjust to allow final expiration of copyrights which
would expire after the determination is made that revision is necessary,
but before the technical complications of formulating a revised statute can
be unraveled and final enactment take place. During this interim period,
expiration should be postponed to allow those persons, whose copyrights
would expire during this time, the benefit of the new statute providing a
longer term. The above analysis presupposes first, that there is a deter-
mination by Congress that revision by extending the term is necessary
(which may be implied from the proposal of the interim statute in the first
32. Congress appropriated funds for a study of the needs of revision in the
copyright law in 1955, 1956, 1957, and the Register of Copyrights submitted his
report on proposed revision in July, 1961.
33. H.R.J. Res. 627, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
34. Hearing, supra note 21.
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place) ; second, that Congress realizes that revising the statute could take
a considerable length of time and third, that the new statute will probably
extend existing copyrights as well as copyrights acquired after its enact-
ment. None of these presuppositions is unrealistic.3 5
The Justice Department in a letter written by Nicholas DeB. Katzen-
bach, then Acting Deputy Attorney General, which was addressed to the
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, opposed the enactment of this
interim statute.3 6 Upon inspection of the letter it appears that only one
objection was made which specifically deals with the interim statute, the
others being directed against the extension of the copyright term itself.
The Justice Department contends that if the interim statute is passed, and
legislation extending the copyright term is not enacted by December 31,
1967, the result would be an arbitrary extension of the period of copyright
for a limited class of persons and for varying periods of time. This objec-
tion lacks substance because: first, it merely states a result which would
follow from enactment of the interim statute without stating any reason
why such a result is not justified and second, as indicated above, the interim
statute is based on "fairness" so that use of the term arbitrary, if used to
connote injustice, is particularly inappropriate. Once this statement by the
Justice Department is neutralized, and assuming that there is need for
extension of the copyright term, no opposition to the interim statute
remains.
This same letter argues that it is only a "speculative theory ' 37 that
the present copyright statute will be revised in the near future. Apparently
the author of the letter believes that there is insufficient interest and support
of revision. Such a view overlooks the public support of an increased
copyright term as demonstrated by the remarks of Congressman Hale
Boggs of Louisiana, majority whip in the House of Representatives:
We are confident that the extension of the term of copyright is
no longer a "speculative" theory. We cannot believe that in this day
and age, and in the climate of our present society, the rights and
interests of our creators, particularly our elder creators, will be ruth-
lessly disregarded. It is unthinkable to believe that our country will
lag behind the rest of the world in the recognition of the intellectual
property rights of creators of literature, music and art.
No, the prospect of the modernization and adjustment of our
copyright term is not a mere "speculative" theory-it is a, certainty
to which all must be dedicated.3 8 (Emphasis added.)
Since revision is necessary, if not long overdue, an interim statute
aimed at protecting rights which would otherwise lapse is urgently needed
35. On the second presupposition see note 32 supra. On the third presupposition
see REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS TO HousE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ON THE GENERAL REvISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 57
(Comm. Print 1961).
36. Hearing, supra note 21 at 88, 89.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 5.
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and should receive prompt consideration. The certainty of revision referred
to by Congressman Boggs should only serve to hasten enactment of such
a statute.
V.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis is the basis for the writer's following conclusions.
First, there is an urgent need for revision of the United States copyright
statute in many areas. In order to treat all outstanding copyright owners
equally, pending revision, an interim statute should be enacted preserving
the rights of those copyrights nearing expiration. Upon revision of the
copyright statute, the term must be extended either by extending the re-
newal term from twenty-eight to forty-eight years which when added to
the original term of twenty-eight years will provide a possible total of
seventy-six years protection, or changing our present two-term system to
one of life of the author plus fifty years. Either solution will be a vast
improvement, the latter Solution is preferred. Such a solution would
bring the United States into conformity with the majority of free world
countries and enable it to justify its position as a cultural leader by finally
providing adequate protection for its authors.
Michael R. Bradley
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